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ABSTRACT  
 
This note takes a retrospective look at the Utility Construct still in use in 
economic science and compares it to a new approach based on recent 
findings in neuroscience. The results show that it is more natural and 
more compelling to go from the preference order to the price vector. Thus 
making the non-falsifiable utility apparatus superfluous.  
 
 
I- INTRODUCTION 
 
A C2 function is one whose second derivatives in its arguments exist and are 
continuous.  According to a group of economist-pioneers, a throw-off of some individual’s 
C2 utility function is a well-defined demand function, which is differentiable and 
homogeneous of degree zero in budget and prices, a corner stone of economic theory.  The 
utility function itself is supposedly derived from a well-ordered individual preference 
relation, thus making the demand function dependent on two subjective concepts; namely, a 
C2 utility function and a well-ordered preference relation.  The economizing problem is 
essentially one of optimization, but the early pioneers were not sure as to how to proceed to 
optimization from a mere ranking, whether well-ordered or not.  In addition, it was initially 
and erroneously believed that utility maximization would yield richness and robustness; 
hence the foray into utility, as preference was debased to a primitive concept.   
However, the path from a well-ordered preference relation to a C2 function is fraught 
with some dangerous anomalies.  Initially, it was thought that a strictly convex and 
continuous preference relation suffices to yield a strictly quasi-concave utility function. 
Subsequently, however, it was realized that these properties might not have been strong 
enough to yield an everywhere differentiable demand function. Additional conditions would 
be required at the levels of both preference and utility.  That realization spurred the vast 
research programme that gives substance to today’s economists’ discourse on utility. In 
retrospect, it is easily seen that economists had expanded a considerable amount of energy 
  
and time to figure out all conditions they thought were necessary to arrive at well-specified 
demand functions.  The relevant and voluminous literature attests to that.  See for example, 
Pareto (1896), Wold (1943, 1944), Samuelson (1947), Debreu (1959, 1960, 1964, 1976), 
Radner (1963), Sonnenschein (1965, 1971), Smeidler (1971), Koopmans (1972), 
Hildenbrand (1974), Shafer (1974), just to name a few.  However, despite that effort, the 
preference order-utility construct remains to this day hazy and problematic. Worst still, its 
predictions are regularly falsified whether in simple observation, personal experience, or in 
experimental designs.    
At first sight, one would think that economists should be uneasy when faced with 
such incongruities, but one should also bear in mind that when these concepts were being 
developed, they had no means of gazing into the workings of the human brain. This is no 
longer so, however.  With more mature reflections and new tools(1) (developed by 
physicists), neuroscientists are now able to examine the brain’s architecture in a non 
invasive manner.  Their findings are compelling enough to encourage economists to revisit 
their construct; and this note is a first step in that direction.  
I will first briefly review the existing construct mainly to see why the ensuing 
problems continue to defy satisfactory solutions.  Next, I will examine an alternative 
approach based on the findings of neuroscience, and compare the two sets of results.  As the 
results of the alternative approach are very compelling, hopefully, they might sway 
economists to finally view the utility function as an unnecessary appendage.  
 
II- CONDITIONS FOR A WELL-ORDERED PREFERENCE RELATION  
 
Until the late 1920s, the notion of preference relation was loosely equated with utility. 
At the same time though, many were still confusing preference with taste, which was 
thought to be fixed.  Around the 1940s, however, economists began to differentiate the two. 
While recognizing preference as more basic, utility began to appear as a more convenient 
device to describe consumer behavior; although nobody knew how preferences were 
formed, and to this day it seems that whatever is said about preferences still leaves the 
associated utility function incompletely specified.  To avoid pathologies, therefore, 
economists began to ‘finick’ both concepts so as to meet the requirements of maximizing 
behavior. At the same time, developments in set theory provide them with a language and 
  
rules to undertake the task with thoroughness.  For tractability, I show in Table 1 a list of 
axioms and conditions that the preference relation is supposed to satisfy and to which I will 
refer throughout the discussion.  To arrive at a C2 utility function, still more are needed, but 
I will only mention them only in passing, because they will not be necessary for the present 
purpose.  In fact, I believe that that additional panoply of conditions is outright superfluous. 
For in this case, mathematical formalism, though helpful in description and analysis, can 
not dictate consumer behavior.  Further, to describe, mathematically or otherwise, one must 
first understand, although but in the present case, it seems that formalism had taken 
precedence over concreteness.   
Imaging a typical consumer, denoted by i, facing consumption set X, which a 
collection of consumption bundles as its elements.  In general, X is the non negative orthant 
in Rk+ (k =1, 2, …,n), where R is the reals.  For ease of exposition, however, I posit X = {x, 
y, z}, where x, y, and z are thing-like entities over which consumer i expresses a value 
judgement at a particular instant of time.  A binary relation P on X is a subset of the 
Cartesian product on X with itself.  Also P stands for a weak preference. Thus writing (xPy) 
means that x is preferred to y, because consumer i considers x ‘as good as’ y.  The binary 
relation becomes an equivalence relation, I, under certain conditions, in the sense that 
writing (xIy) means that i is ‘indifferent’ between x and y; in other words, (xIy) if and only 
if (xPy) and (yPx), implying the symmetry of  I.  
Still later on, economists realized that a weak preference relation could not ensure 
continuity in P, hence, nor in u(.), the utility function, because the upper and lower contour 
sets of P are ‘closed’ relative to X.  They then posited P’ as a strict preference relation (a 
stronger assumption).  Thus (xP’y) means that x is ‘strictly preferred to’ y, because i 
believes that x is ‘as good as’ y, but not conversely.  The supposed advantage here is that 
under P’, the upper and lower contour sets are ‘open’ relative to X.  
Referring to Table 1, a P’ that meets A1-A4 and C1 is said to be linear or complete.  
The equivalence relation satisfying B1-B3 follows.  Monotonicity (C2) too follows 
naturally for most goods.  Thus, the difference between P and P’ is reduced to the 
following: P satisfies A3, A4 and B1, while the indifference relation given by,   
                                                   I(x) ={y ε X| (yP’x)} ∩ {y ε X | (xP’y)}, 
  
TABLE 1:  Axioms and conditions* for a Well-Ordered Preference Relation 
  
 
 
i., e., the intersection of the contour sets are closed under P and open under P’. It can 
immediately be seen why P’ does not admit B1, for, x, say, cannot be strictly preferred to 
itself.  However, this difference is a consequence of C1 that ensures continuity and which at 
once seems to introduce surreptitiously time in the analysis.  In words, C1 says that if 
(xP’y), say, and if there exits a sequence zt that converges to some x* close to the bundle x, 
then (zP’y).  Then, it is not farfetched to assume that the consumer can order X in time, as 
the sequence converges in finite time.  If z1, z 2, z 3 , … are subsequent selections, then there 
is  a time dimension, which somehow had gotten lost in the analysis; I will later return the 
question of time and to other questions relative to the empirical content of A4. For the time 
being, let us suppose that if P’ satisfies A1- A4 and C1, the relation I will satisfy B1-B3. 
Then P’ is said to be linear or complete.  We may also call it an ‘empirical relational 
system’, represented by: 〈X, P’, I〉. To justify that claim and to say more about it, Theorem 
1 may be invoked:  
 
A-  The binary Relation P’  
 
∀(x, y, z) ε X: 
1-     Irreflexivity          ……………………………..……….  ¬(xP’x)  
2-     Asymmetry            ………………..……………....  (xP’y) →  ¬ (yP’x)  
3-     Connexity           ……..………………………….(xP’y) →  (xP’z) ∨ (zP’y)  
4-     Transitivity         …………….…………….....      (xP’y) ∧ (yP’z) → (xP’z) .  
 
B-  The Equivalence Relation I  
 
1-     Reflexivity   ………………………  ……………….. (xP’x), (yP’y) ∧ (zP’z)   
2-     Symmetry     ……………………     ……………..….    (xP’y)  →  (yP’x)   
3-     Transitivity   ………………………..      ………………..  as in A-4   
 
C-  Additional Conditions   
  
 1-    Continuity  ………… …….    If (xP’y) and there exists a  sequence zt such that  
                          lim zt  →x* close to x → (zP’y) → open upper ∧ lower contour sets  
                          relative to X. 
                          t →n   
2-     Monotonicity   …………….………………  ∀(x, y, z) ε X, more is preferred to less.  
  
Theorem 1    If 〈X, P’, I〉 is linear or complete, then it has a countable base and it can be       
represented by an ordinal one-dimensional scale.  
 
Next, Zorn’s Lemma (1935) can be also be invoked to justify the following 
consequential statements (CT):   
 
CT-1       An ordered set, X, is said to be well-ordered if X and each of its non-empty 
subsets have first elements in the prescribed ordering of X.     
 
CT-2          Every well-ordered set X is totally ordered.  
 
CT-3          The converse of CT-2 holds if X is finite.  
 
This result is upheld as significant and it authorizes its authors to claim that if 〈X, P’, I〉 is 
well-ordered, then there exists a continuous utility function u: Rk+ → R+.  Furthermore, if u 
and u’ are both maps of the empirical relational system 〈X, P’, I〉 into a real number R, then 
u’ is a monotone transformation of u.  
At this juncture, it might be of interest to stress once more that P’ is selected over P, 
because the latter, although more basic, was thought to be unable to meet all the associated 
topological conditions to generate a well-defined u. Can P’ do so? Not quite.  The 
consumption sets of the poor are difficult to well-order due to product differentiation (i., e., 
lack of information).  The consumption sets of non-poor (most consumers)    consist of 
necessities and discretionary goods.  That is, those two types of goods are not really 
comparable. In such a case, the continuity assumption (C1) is violated. Only a lexicographic 
order is possible, as trade-offs between necessities and discretionary goods do not exist. 
Indeed, the very definition of the binary relation is not satisfied.  The monotonicity 
assumption is satisfied in most cases; that is, when the entities are thing-likes, but not 
generally as in the case of leisure, for example, where less may be preferred to more.  More 
telling though is that consumers continue to make intransitive choices, and sometime they 
are observed even acting in a manner that seems contrary to the dictates of utility 
maximization.  Following that another debate ensued.  Sonnenschein (1965) argued that 
continuity (C1) and connexity (A3) suffice to ensure transitivity (A4). Shafer (1971) 
followed, arguing that continuity and transitivity just imply connexity.  But again, many 
known relations simply do not display continuity as in the case of lexicographic ordering. 
Faced with this dilemma, economists became overtly finicky with the derived u, adding 
  
conditions such as convexity, upper-semi-continuity, indirectness, separability, Cobb-
Douglas-ness, etc. in an attempt to bloc eventual anomalies.  As a result, instead of the 
ordinal scale allowed by Theorem 1, they have inadvertently produced a theoretically safe 
construct, also one that has been proven not to have any empirical content.  
 
III- AN ALTERNATIVE 
 
   I have given the reader a succinct account of why these early pioneers were so eager 
to construct a C2 utility function.  One can easily understand that, knowing preciously little 
about how preference was formed, they had to rely on Boolean reasoning and operations to 
grapple with the slipperiness of such a concept.  More recently, however, new tools have 
been made available.  Now neuroscientists can readily observe brains’ workings easily and 
non-intrusively(2).  As a result, the brain comes to be viewed as essentially a dynamic 
input/output structure.  Mathematically and succinctly put, there exist a set of external input 
stimuli, satellite structures (such as the visual cortex), two state spaces, (L) and (χ), and a 
number of maps.  L is the limbic system or the brain stem, χ is the frontal cortex, some of 
the maps are ‘onto’ while others are ‘one-to-one’.  Moreover, L is the site of memory 
(factual and emotive experience), and χ is where computation, deduction and overall 
evaluation take place.  
To clarify, consider an example of how external stimuli are mapped onto L, and χ. 
Seeing a bundle x, say, means that light patterns are received in the photoreceptor cells in 
the retina, where they are immediately converted into neuronal signals, and the 
neurotransmitter acetylcholine is released throughout the prefrontal cortex and to all its 
satellite structures (Crick and Koch, 2003; Koch, 2007).  This gives rise to an emergent 
property, e, which focuses and directs attention to a task, implying also that the seer is in 
the state of wakefulness (Greenfield, 2007).  Next, neuronal signals, made out of 
specialized neurons, traveled through the optic nerve to the lateral geniculate nucleus in the 
thalamus, and from there to the visual cortex (where light patterns are identified) via the 
neural cords (called optic radiation, leading to the occipital lobe) and on to the 
hippocampus (Martinez-Conde, 2006; Martinez-Conde and Macknik,2007).  The later 
harbors what neuroscientists call ‘neuronal cliques’, which are specialized neurons 
  
invariantly organized hierarchically from the general to the specific (Tsien, 2007).  
Different cliques or circuits respond to perceptual, factual and emotional aspects of the 
inputs.  Beside, the hippocampus receives information from photoreceptors, from the 
geniculate nucleus, from the vestibular system, from the locus coerulus, from the amygdala, 
etc. and from other neurons encoded with general and abstract information to be used in 
future situations.  Thus, the identification of x fed to χ by L and other satellite structures for 
a final evaluation is a mixture of factual and emotional assessments of the image of x or 
something likes it.  This complex flows may be conveniently divided into two categories, 
namely objective information, I0, and the emotive mixture, eL.  Therefore, state space χ may 
be represented by a dynamical system 〈I0, eL, e〉 that brings these two flows of 
neurotransmitters into an equilibrium; that equilibrium is of course, an informational 
equilibrium, but it is similar to a thermodynamic one.  
In all of this, the role of the emergent factor, e ε [-1 1] can not be overemphasized.  It 
exists only in the state of wakefulness (compared to the state of dormancy); it is the maestro 
in charge of the traffic of neurotransmitters from various parts of the brain; it may be 
associated with judgement and its intensity varies with the intensity of the input stimulus 
(Greenfield, 2007).  If the informational assessment realized in state space χ is a ‘scalar 
field’, then e gives the field a direction.      
I have shown elsewhere (Dominique, 2006), that the assessment of the state space χ is 
none other than a “potential” that must be minimized using a differential map.  It suffices 
for the present purpose to say that the equilibrium value, P, is some sort of a linear 
combination of I0 and eL.  The stronger are the intensities of these flows the higher is P. 
With an appropriate additional transformation, I was able to identify the topology of the 
brain as a bi-modal cusp catastrophe given by:   
    (i)               Ψ(〈I0, eL, e〉) ε C∞ (Rv + c, R ),  
where v ≤ 2 is the corank and c is the codim of Ψ.  To put it differently, the two ordinal 
scales in χ are mapped onto two equilibrium manifolds, M+ and M-. M+ maps equilibrium 
points onto R+ and, analogously, M- maps equilibria onto R-.  
In the present case, appealing to the Thom’s (1975) Classification Theorem proved 
very useful in identifying and analyzing the nature of P in equation (i) above.  Since 
  
neuroscientists affirm that signals travel at speed up to 525 feet a second, I then ignored 
slow dynamics to concentrate on points mapped onto R+ under very fast dynamics.  When 
they are projected onto R+, such points are not equidistant near the maximal element (the 
highest point in the direction in which preference runs) as the equilibrium manifold is a 
curved surface.  Hence, preference indices near but inferior to the maximal element are 
more compact, while those near but superior to the minimal element are more unclenched. 
This means that the continuity property of P is not guaranteed.   Finally, it can immediately 
be seen that the manner in which all additional or new information are appraised in χ may 
shift an equilibrium point on M+ or may even cause it to jump onto M- ; implying that it is 
possible to go from preference to dis-preference in a natural way.                                                         
If equilibria are given by P, and the well-ordered preference is denoted Rxyz, solving 
the economizing problem implies applying the maps Ð, h1, h2 and M. That is, Ð: 〈I0, eL, e〉 
→ P,  h2: P → Rxyz, such that:  
    (ii)               M = Rxyz  →  P, 
where M, is a composite map or a market (simplified to a pure exchange) that takes us to 
the price vector P directly from the ordering.  
The way M is constructed is as follows: First, it ignores points on M
-
, as goods 
eliciting such equilibria are not in the consumption set X.  Suppose consumers are limited 
to 3 (i =1,2, 3), then Px , Py , Pz, mapped onto R+ yield the ordering (xP’y) ∧ (yP’z), call it 
ℜi .  In equilibrium, that ordering is preserved when it is mapped onto market shares, ∝, 
and onto total equilibrium expenditures (∝B).  Since in equilibrium, expenditures are equal 
to market values (V), then, we have:  
 
   ℜixyz  → Vx  > Vy > Vz = (∝ix Bi) > (∝iy Bi) > (∝iz Bi).  If Vx  = (∝ix Bi) → ∆Px /∆ x < 0, ∀ (x,y,z) ε X.   
 
If now ℜixyz  is mapped onto the budget share set {∝i } such that Σi ∝xyz = 1, and if supply is 
fixed, then in equilibrium:  
 
                                       Σi ∝xi  >  Σi ∝yi  >  Σi ∝zi   →   Px  >  Py  >  Pz .  
 
Thus, the utility construct is unnecessary, and there is no explicit effort on the part of the 
consumer to maximize anything.   
  
IV-FINAL REMARKS 
 
    I have tried to show that Theorem 1 allows for a simple ordinal scale:  
 
   (iii)             u (〈X, P’, I)〉: R
 
k
 
 → R+ ,   
as equation (iii) does not completely specify u(.). But to satisfy the imperative of utility 
maximization, economists construct:  
 
  (iv)              u (〈X, P’, I〉) ε C2 (Rk , R+);  
this produces uncomfortable anomalies.  By integrating the findings of neuroscience, we 
arrive at equation (ii) above, which is more concrete and presents a number of advantages 
over the conventional one.  To wit:  
Firstly, it dispenses with the need of continuous ordinal scales in conformity with 
nature itself, which is not continuous.  Secondly, it is robust to a violation of the 
monotonicity condition, because it accounts for the context; thing-like objects are special 
cases.  Thirdly, it distinguishes between transitivity and ambivalence.  In this alternative, 
transitivity occurs when two imperfect substitute bundles receive the same ranking; the 
information set of the consumer is considered (by him or her) complete and, therefore, there 
is no reason for the consumer to appear inconsistent.  Ambivalence, on the other hand, may 
occur when the substitutes have different attractive characteristics, but the information set is 
incomplete; in that case, the consumer can not decide on the ranking.  Fourthly, it gives 
substance to what Simon (1985) has termed ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ rationalities; here, 
they appear as a linear combination.  Fifthly, it resolves the dilemma of the so-called called 
Ultimatum Game(3).  That is, the proportion offered to player B might be deemed unfair 
and, therefore, B turns it down to punish greed; in such a case, the flow eL dominates I0. 
Sixthly, it resolves a phenomenon observed by Tversky and Kaneman(4) (1981).  That is, by 
letting x stands for money, and y for theater ticket, we have: (yP’x) in state 1, and (xP’y) in 
state 2; this is explained by what philosophers call ‘change in preference horizon’ or 
‘different states of nature’ by economists.  Seventhly, the conventional presentation can not 
explain changes over time in the utility function; here the time element is ever present. 
Eighthly, the conventional approach can not accommodate the impacts of emotions on 
choices, as alluded to by theorists such as John Elster, Herbert Simon, John M. Keynes, 
  
etc... Frank Knight, for example, believed that “human activity is largely impulsive 
response to stimuli and suggestions.”  
Finally, it should be observed that an equilibrium point mapped onto R+ is a 
valuation, V.  The higher is the position of x in the ranking, the higher is the V of x, 
commanding a corresponding proportion ∝ of consumer i’s budget B.  Hence, if both 
quantity and price could be made perfectly divisible, individual consumer demand could be 
a rectangular hyperbola.  Indeed, in Dominique (1999, ch.3), it is shown how the invertible 
map M is constructed for a simple 3 goods-3 consumer economy to minimize a potential 
market gain, and how it easily maps ℜ onto P (the equilibrium price vector of a pure 
exchange model), but without the hypothesis of utility maximization. And variations in the 
price vector are perfectly correlated with changes in the ranking order.      
 
NOTES 
  
1  For example, Computed tomography scans (CT), Positron Emission tomography scans (PET), 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), Functional Magnetic Imaging (fMRI), Magneto-
encephalography (MEG), Trans-cranial Stimulation (TMS), etc.   
 
2  Many of their findings are discussed in the popular press. See, for example, The New York 
Times, June 17, 2006, and November 22, 2006, US& World Report, Oct. 18, 2006, and 
Scientific American, July, August and October 2007.  
 
3  This experiment involves two players, A and B. A, say, is given a certain sum, s, and A must 
give a proportion k of his or her choosing to B. If B accepts k s, then B may keep (1-k) s. 
However, if A refuses k s, as she deems k too low, both players end up with nothing. The 
experiment shows that if k is less than 20 percent of s, the offer is rejected.   
          
4  Tversky and Kaneman have observed that 88 percent of subjects in their sample say if they 
arrived at a theater to buy a $ 10 ticket for a play and then discovered that they had lost $10 on 
the way, they would buy the ticket anyway.  But if the ticket was bought in advance and 
discovered when they arrived in the theater that they had lost the ticket, 54 percent say they 
would not buy another ticket.  In the conventional approach, the 54 percent would be labeled 
‘irrational’.  
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